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Epidemiological and experimental 
studies indicate that alcohol-impaired 
drivers are a cause of a large number 
of traffic crashes, It is estimated that 
such crashes generate costs to 
society in the order of $1 0 billion or 
more. Society has responded to the 
alcohol-crash risk by using a variety of 
approaches. Chief among them is the 
legal approach that is based on 
deterrence: the threat of punishment 
is used to prevent individuals from 
driving while impaired. Other 
approaches, including health, public 
information and education, and 
technology, complement the 
traditional legal approach, and these 
are often used simultaneously. 
However, society's efforts to control 
the risk of drinking driving generally 
have not had much of an effect on the 
problem. 
This paper identifies the alcohol- 
crash risk, describes society's 
principal strategies and tactics for 
reducing this risk, discusses the 
relative success of these efforts, and 
presents recommendations for 
appropriate action against the 
problem of the drinking driver, 
Introduction 
The alcohol-crash problem probably has 
received more attention over a longer period of 
time than any other area in the field of highway 
safety. Long before any other highway safety topic 
had been made legitimate as a subject for . 
"serious" inquiry, drunken drivers of "automobile 
wagons" were being written about in scientific 
journals. The now-famous quote in a 1904 issue of 
the Quarterly Journal of Inebriety contains what 
surely must be one of the first epidemiologic 
findings on this subject, that nineteen drivers in- 
volved in twenty-five fatal accidents had "used 
spirits within an hour or more of the disaster." The 
article went on prophetically to predict that "acci- 
dents of this kind will surely multiply," one of the 
more notable successes in the history of long- 
range forecasting. 
Despite this early start, scientific study of the 
alcohol-crash risk did not progress far until the 
1930s, when a series of epidemiologic and experi- 
mental studies began to sketch out the broad 
d~mensions of the problem. Epidemiological 
studies seek to determine the prevalence of 
alcohol in both crash- and non-crash-involved 
drivers, while experimental studies are conducted 
to determine what effects a given quantity of 
alcohol has on skills related to driving. These 
studies have continued to the present time and are 
still continuing. They clearly show that alcohol- 
impaired drivers are a cause of a large number of 
highway crashes in the United States, The studies 
also provide information about the nature of 
alcohol-related crashes and the drivers who are in- 
volved in them. 
40% to  55% of  all the  fatally in jured 
dr ivers tested had  BACs  of . I  0% 
W/V or more. These drivers were 
too  intoxicated t o  legally dr ive a 
motor  vehicle in mos t  states. 
have been conducted at different times over a long 
time period, and their objectives, methods, and ex- 
ecution have varied widely. A more fundamental 
difficulty in estimating the magnitude of alcohol- 
crash risk is that most epidemiologic studies have 
been concerned with alcohol involvement in 
crashes rather than alcohol as a causal factor in 
crashes. That a driver has been drinking does not 
necessarily mean that alcohol caused the driver to 
crash. Causes other than alcohol also must be 
eliminated. A combination of epidemiologic and 
experimental results are needed to address the 
question of causality, and even then, only rough 
estimates are possible. In this paper we use the 
number and percentage of crashed drivers with 
blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) of .lOOh w/v 
or greater as measures of the magnitude of the 
alcohol crash problem. (A BAC of .10% is the legal 
limit for alcohol intoxication in most states.) While it 
cannot be said that all crashes involving such 
drivers are caused by alcohol, there is much 
evidence that one's risk of a crash is much higher 
at such BACs than at BACs approaching zero. 
Identifying the Alcohol-Crash Risk 
Alcohol and Traffic Crashes 
Epidemiological studies of the alcohol-crash 
problem frequently compare the extent of alcohol 
involvement among crashed drivers against those 
who have not crashed. In these studies, a higher 
proportion of alcohol involvement among the 
crashed drivers does not necessarily indicate that 
the crashes were caused by alcohol con- 
sumption, but it does raise an inference that 
alcohol is a cause. Studies also have attempted to 
differentiate among drinking drivers-both crash- 
and non-crash-involved-in an attempt to identify 
those groups that appear to pose an especially 
great risk to highway safety. 
The results of these risk-identification studies 
are summarized briefly below. The difficulty in 
developing hard-and-fast numbers for such a 
complicated phenomenon will become apparent. 
This is because of the lack of nationwide 
epidemiologic studies and because local studies 
Fatal Crashes 
Only four studies in this country (Neilson 1969; 
Waller et al. 1970; Filkins et al, 1970; Perrine, 
Waller, and Harris 1971) are known to provide 
an objective scientific basis for estimating alcohol 
involvement in fatal highway crashes. All of these 
studies measured the BACs of fatally injured 
drivers who survived less than six hours after the 
crash. The measurements were taken by coroners 
and medical examiners for nearly all fatally injured 
drivers in their respective jurisdictions, thus 
avoiding possible biases that could be introduced 
in selecting drivers for BAC measurement. 
The results of these studies are shown in Figure 
1. It  can be seen that 40% to 55% of all the fatally 
injured drivers tested had BACs of . lo% wlv or 
more. These drivers were too intoxicated to legally 
drive a motor vehicle in most states. A large per- 
centage of the clrivers (29% to 43%) had BACs in 
the very high range of .15% wlv or greater and 
16% to 28% had BACs of .20°/0 w/v or greater. (A 
175-pound person would have to consume ap- 
proximately 6 ounces of 86 proof liquor in an hour 
to reach a BAC of -10% wlv and 8 ounces in an 
hour to reach -15% w/v. 
Fatally injured drivers in single vehicle crashes 
tend to show even higher blood alcohol con- 
centrations than fatally injured drivers in general. 
As shown in Figure 2, by legal standards, 55% to 
65% of the fatally injured drivers in such crashes 
were too intoxicated to drive, and 35% to 54% had 
BACs greater than .15% w/v. 
Nonfatal Crashes 
Only three North American studies of nonfatal 
crashes have taken BAC measurements at the 
scene of the crash: 
The Toronto study in 1951 and 1952 
(Lucas et al. 1955), 
The Grand Rapids study in 1962 to 1983 
(Borkenstein et al. 1964), and 
The Huntsville/San Diego study in 1974 to 
1977 (Farris, Malone, and Lillienfors 1976). 
Figure 3 shows the BACs of drivers involved in 
all types of nonfatal crashes in Toronto and Grar~d 
Rapids. The Toronto data indicate about 15% of 
the crashed drivers had BACs in excess of . lo1% 
w/v but the Grand Rapids study showed only 
about 6% of the crashed drivers at these BAC:;. 
Figure 1 
Percentage of Drivers Fatally Injured in Crashes with BACs 
Equal to or Greater Than Given Levels 
LEGAL LIMIT 
FOR DRIVING 





0 .04+ .08+ .lo+ .12+ .16- .20+ .24+ .28+ 
BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION (% wiv)  
Source: Jones and Joscelyn 1978. 
Figure 2 
Percentage of Drivers Fatally Injured in Single Vehicle Crashes 
with BACs Equal to or Greater Than Given Levels 
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BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION (% w/v) 
Source: Jones and Joscelyn 1978. 
Figure 3 
Percentage of Drivers Involved in Nonfatal Crashes 
with BACs Equal to or Greater Than Given Levels 
LEGAL LIMIT FOR DRIVING 
IN MOST STATES 
Ot .04+ .08+ .lot ,124- .16+ ,201- .24+ 
BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION (% w/v) 
Source: Jones and Joscelyn 1978. 
- 
Even an effective alcohol 
countermeasure program cannot 
be expected to have a large effect 
on the overall crash experience. In 
the past, the alcohol-crash risk has 
been overstated and 
countermeasure programs 
oversold. 
This is possibly due to the fact that the Toronto 
data were taken in the evening hours when drink- 
ing is more frequent while the Grand Rapids data 
were taken around the clock. 
The BACs of drivers in personal injury crashes 
are shown in Figure 4. The Huntsville data show 
that about 13% had BACs in excess of -10% w/v, 
and the Grand Rapids study found about 9% had 
BACs greater than . lo% wlv. Data from San Diego 
alone had not been presented in the literature, but 
combined HuntsvilleISan Diego data indicate a 
similar distribution of BACs. Figure 5 shows the 
BAC measurements taken in the Grand Rapids 
study for 4,570 drivers involved in crashes whelre 
there were "no indications of injury," that is, 
property damage only crashes. Only about 5% of 
these were at or above BACs of , lo% wlv. 
National Implications 
The above cited epidemiologic studies shciw 
that some 40% to 55% of all fatally injured drivers 
had blood alcohol concentrations in excess 3f 
-10% wlv. Smaller but still significant fractions of 
drivers involved in injury crashes (9% to 13%) anld 
property damage crashes (5%) had these high 
BACs. The national impact of these figures is enor- 
mous. If one assumes that the national per- 
centages lie at the midpoints of the ranges stated 
above, then in 1975 the numbers of crashes in- 
volving drivers with BACs of . lo% wlv or greater 
were: 
Fatal crashes: 15,200 
Personal injury crashes: 120,000 
Property damage crashes: 765,000 
Figure 4 
Percentage of Drivers Involved in Nonfatal, Personal Injury Crashes 
with BACs Equal to or Greater Than Given Levels 
LEGAL LIMIT FOR DRIVING 
IN MOST STATES 
0 .04+ .08+ ,101. .12+ .16+ .20+ .24+ 
BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION ( %  wlv)  
Source: Jones and Joscelyn 1978. 
We estimate the societal cost of these crashes to 
be in the order of $10 billion. These costs include, 
for example, lost productivity, welfare and in- 
surance payments, and the use of police and 
emergency medical services. The losses would be 
even higher if the thousands of crashes that in- 
volved lower but still possibly impairing BACs were 
counted. 
Alcohol impairment clearly increases the traffic 
crash risk. The risk, however, has often been over- 
stated in the past. A commonly heard fallacy is that 
half of all traffic crashes are caused by drunk 
drivers. This is not true. In fact, if all drunk drivers 
(those with a BAG of , lo% wlv or greater) were to 
be magically removed from the nation's high- 
ways, we estimate that over fifty percent of the fatal 
crashes, eighty-five percent of the personal injury 
crashes, and ninety-five percent of the property 
damage crashes would still occur. 
This does not suggest that alcohol impairment is 
an insignificant problem. What it does show is that 
even an effective alcohol countermeasure pro- 
gram cannot be expected to have a large effect on 
the overall crash experience. In the past, the 
alcohol-crash risk has been overstated and 
countermeasure programs oversold. This should 
be avoided in the future. The risk should be ac- 
curately stated and risk management expectations 
reasonably set. 
Correlations of the Alcohol- 
Crash Problem 
To deal with the risk caused by drunk drivers, it 
is important to know who these drivers are. Accor- 
dingly, epidemiologic studies also have examined 
the demographic characteristics, drinking and 
driving habits, physical and psychological attri- 
butes, and attitudes of drinking drivers in an at- 
tempt to provide sharper definitions of groups of 
drinking drivers. Such information is essential for 
designing countermeasures to deal with the drink- 
ing driver problem. 
Biographical Variables 
Sex has been found to be the strongest dif- 
ferentiator between drivers with alcohol-related 
Figure 5 
Percentage of Drivers Involved in Nonfatal, No injury, 
Property Damage Crashes with BACs Equal to or Greater Than a Given Level 
0-t .04 + .08+ ,104 .12+ .16+ .20+ 
BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION (% wiv) 
Source: Jones and Joscelyn 1978. 
Figure 6 
Age Distributions of Fatally lnjured Drivers 
with BACs of . lo% w/v or Greater (Cumulative) 
Source: 
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TABLE 7 
AGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF FATALLY INJURED DRIVERS WITH 
BACs OF -10% w/v AND LICENSED MALE DRIVERS IN 1975 
Fatally lnjured Male Licensed 
Age Drunk Drivers, %l Drivers, Oh2 
TOTAL 99.93 100.13 
and Harris 1971) 
Based on data from Perrine, Waller, and Harr~s (1971); Filkins et al, 
(1 970); and Neilson (1 969). 
2 Based on data from US.  Department of Commerce (1975); U.S. 
Department of Transportation (1975b). 
3 The percentages do not total 100% due to rounding. 
Figure 8 
Percentage of Crash-Involved Drivers Who 
Had Been Drinking, by Time of Day 
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Source: Jones and Joscelyn 1978. 
Figure 9 
Percentage of Drivers Who Had Been Drinking, by Day of Week 
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Source: Jones and Joscelyn 1978. 
dysfunctions and drivers as a whole. Male drivers 
appear far more frequently than female drivers in 
all kinds of crashes (National Safety Council 
1979). Males c;omprise even higher percentages 
of drivers in the more serious crashes. Similarly, 
while males account for the majority of those using 
the roads, males make up an even larger fraction 
of high BAC drivers (that is, over . lo% wlv). Not 
surprisingly, the predominantly male nature of 
drunk driving is reflected in the arrest statistics for 
drunk driving, which typically show that ninety-five 
percent of those arrested for drunk driving are 
male. 
With respect to age, both the youngest and the 
oldest drivers have been found less frequently 
than other drivers in the drunk driver population. 
Also, the youngest and oldest crash-involved 
drivers have consistently had lower BACs than 
other crash-involved drivers; however, the most 
reliable studies of the alcohol involvement in fatal 
crashes provide remarkably consistent profiles of 
the age distribution of drunk drivers who were 
killed in crashes (see Figure 6). When the dis- 
tribution is compared with that of all male licensed 
drivers-about 90% of all fatally injured drunk 
drivers are male-the overrepresentation of drivers 
aged twenty to forty-five years in the crash popula- 
tion becomes apparent (Table 7). It can also be 
seen that the median age of fatally injured drunk 
drivers is about thirty years compared to thirty- 
seven for all fatally injured male drivers. 
Studies of drivers' marital status have shown 
that married persons comprise the largest per- 
centage of drive~rs who have crashed and of drink- 
ing drivers usirig the road (see, for example, 
Persons arrested for drunk driving 
are seldom female, very young, or 
very old. They are usually arrested 
during weekends and at night and 
are often engaged in low status 
occupatio~is. 
Borkenstein et al. 1964). However, as a group, 
divorced and separated persons seem to combine 
drinking and driving more frequently and may 
have a higher crash risk than married persons. Un- 
fortunately, the effects of marital status on impaired 
driving are often confounded in the literature with 
other effects, such as age, so that it is difficult to 
make unequivocal statements about the effects of 
this variable. 
Less clear relationships have been found 
between other variables and drinking driving, 
There are indications that persons of lower oc- 
cupational levels are overrepresented among 
drinking drivers, but these findings are not con- 
clusive because of the confounding effects of 
other variables such as age and sex. Increased 
alcohol involvement among nonwhites has been 
explained in one study as a socio-economic rather 
than a racial effect. Persons in low-income groups 
were especially overrepresented among nighttime 
drivers in a nationwide survey, particularly at very 
high BACs where they outnumbered other drivers 
by a factor of three to one. Less educated persons 
were found more frequently among drinking 
drivers in some older studies, but more recent 
studies show less of an educational effect except 
at high BACs. However, there is no convincing 
evidence that either occupational level, race, in- 
come, or education is strongly related to alcohol 
crash risk. 
Driving Variables 
Among the many driving variables that ha've 
been studied, time of day has shown some of the 
strongest relationships to drinking driving patterns. 
As might be expected, drinking driving is primarily 
a nighttime phenomenon (see Figure 8). Drinking 
drivers are found two to four times as often in 
nighttime crashes as in daytime crashes. The 
same trend occurs among the nighttime popula- 
tion as a whole, particularly with the high BACs. 
With respect to day of the week, alcohol-related 
crashes and drinking drivers are also more fre- 
quent on weekends than on weekdays, although 
this effect is not nearly as great as it is for time of 
day (see Figure 9). 
Conflicting results have been obtained with 
respect to the relationships between annual mile- 
age driven and drinking driving, There are indica- 
tions that persons who drive relatively infrequently 
may be overrepresented among both drinking 
drivers involved in crashes and drinking drivers not 
involved in crashes, but these results are not con- 
clusive. The relative risk of a crash after drinking 
may also be higher with a very low mileage driver. 
The origin of the trip that involved the illegal drink- 
ing driver is most frequently a bar or another per- 
son's home. 
Research suggests that drinking drivers have 
had a slightly higher number of previous crashes 
and substantially more enforcement actions 
against them than other drivers. Drinking drivers 
have been found to have on the order of fifty per- 
cent more prior contacts with traffic law enforce- 
ment agencies than other drivers. Particularly, 
persons arrested for drunk driving generally have 
more prior driving convictions than other drivers 
and perhaps more prior crashes as well. The 
BACs of persons arrested for drunk driving are 
nearly always at an illegally high level (i.e., in ex- 
cess of -10% w/v). These persons are seldom 
female, very young, or very old. They are usually 
arrested during weekends and at night and are 
often engaged in low status occupations. 
Drinking Variables 
Among those variables that are classified as 
drinking variables, the relationships that have been 
found with respect to drinking frequency and 
quantity are in many ways most enlightening. As 
might be expected, crashed drivers seem general- 
ly more likely to have a higher BAC than non- 
crashed drivers, regardless of drinking frequency. 
However, the ratio of crashed drivers to non- 
crashed drivers tends to decrease with incieasing 
drinking frequency, indicating that more ex- 
perienced drinkers are somehow better able to 
cope with the effects of alcohol on driving. 
One study that investigated the effects of fre- 
quency and quantity on drinking drivers (Perrine, 
Waller, and Harris 1971) found a higher per- 
centage of males among drivers who reported a 
high quantity frequency index (QFI). Also, many 
teenagers were found to have high QFls but QFI 
decreased with a person's age. There were indica- 
tions that crash involved drivers were slightly 
heavier drinkers than other drivers. Drivers in 
alcohol-related crashes were heavier drinkers than 
drivers in non-alcohol-related crashes. 
Studies have also investigated the type of 
beverage preferred by drinking drivers and have 
found that beer is preferred by about two to one 
over other beverages by drinking drivers. An 
especially high preference for beer has been ex- 
pressed by drivers with high BACs and drivers 
who report they are heavy drinkers. 
The place of drinking most frequently reported 
by drinking drivers was their own home (two out of 
three). About twenty-five percent said they usually 
drink at public establishments or parties. The 
higher BACs have most frequently been found 
among drivers who said they drank in public es- 
tablishments. 
-- 
To the extent that the number of 
nonpedestrian fatalities involving 
drunk drivers is a measure of the 
alcohol-crash problem, the 
problem will remain about the 
same with respect to the total 
crash problem in 1985. However, 
because of increased traffic 
volume, plus an anticipated mix of 
very large and very small vehicles, 
a fairly large increase in the total 
crash problem is projected for 
1985. 
Much attention has been given in the literature to 
the drinking driving habits of alcoholics and 
problem drinkers, although many studies do not 
provide precise definitions of the latter term. 
Studies do provide evidence that persons with 
severe drinking problems are highly overrepre- 
sented among fatally injured drivers who have 
BACs greater than .1O0/0 w/v. One study found 
problem drinking to be highly associated with 
drivers found to be responsible for the crashes in 
which they were killed. More than half of all ar- 
rested drinking drivers tested in three Alcohol 
Safety Action Projects were found to be problem 
drinkers. Other research indicates that alcoholics 
in particular have much higher crash rates than the 
driving population as a whole, perhaps even twice 
as high. Alcoholics may also engage in drinking 
driving more frequently than other drinking drivers 
and at higher BACs. 
Personality and Stress Variables 
Studies of personality and stress variables that 
may be related to drinking and driving have not 
been conclusive and offer little reliable information 
for generalizing. Factors that have been found to 
be associated with drinking driving include aliena- 
tion and hostility (especially among young men); 
low personal efficacy; an inordinate amount of ten- 
sion, depression, and fatigue; and risk taking, 
Alcohol, Highway Safety, and the Future 
In 1977 we attempted to project the alcohol- 
crash problem to the mid-1980s by projecting the 
correlates (Jones 1977). We have reexamined the 
assumptions made in that study in the light of more 
recently published data and found that the as- - 
sumptions are still reasonable. Specifically we 
believe that the following expected changes in 
alcohol-crash ciorrelates are relevant over the next 
five years: 
Larger percentage of female drivers, 
Smaller percentage of drivers under 20 
years of age, 
Smaller percentage of drivers over 65 
years of age, 
Larger percentage of drivers in the 20- to 
65-year-old age group, 
Increased per capita consumption of 
alcohol, 
A heterogeneous mixture of large and 
small vehicles with a predominance of 
small cars, 
Slight increase in "safety features" in both 
vehicles and highways, and 
More vehicle miles traveled. 
Factors that could obviate or reduce the effects 
of these expected changes include: 
Large decrease in availability of fuel that 
reduces vehicle miles traveled, 
Widespread adoption of passive restraints 
in cars, 
Major changes in the economic climate (for 
example, a depression or runaway infla- 
tion), 
0 Technical breakthroughs in automobile 
and highway design, 
Prohibitio~i or large-scale restrictions on 
alcohol availability, and 
Widespread usage of drugs other than 
alcohol. 
The net effect of these factors on the alcohol- 
crash problem as presently understood will be to 
increase the number of fatalities by several 
hundred per year, This amounts to about one per- 
cent of the total number of non-pedestrian fatalities 
that could be expected in the mid-1980s. We view 
such a small change as insignificant in the light of 
the uncertainties in the data and conclude that, to 
the extent that the number of non-pedestrian 
fatalities involving drunk drivers is a measure of the 
alcohol-crash problem, the problem will remain 
about the same with respect to the total crash 
problem in 1985. However, because of increased 
traffic volume, plus an anticipated mix of very large 
and very small vehicles, a fairly large increase in 
the total crash problem is projected for 1985; thus, 
the absolute magnitude of the alcohol-crash 
problem should increase substantially by that time. 
This translates into 9,000 more fatalities, 120,000 
more serious injuries, and 127,000 more prope~ty 
damage crashes than occurred in 1975. 
A number of driver characteristics have been 
found to be associated with a higher than average 
involvement in alcohol-related fatal crashes. 
These include male sex, age of 20 to 60 years, 
heavy drinking and severe drinking problems, 
preference for beer over other alcoholic 
beverages, nighttime and weekend driving habits, 
and history of prior arrests for drunk driving. Driver 
characteristics associated with a higher thzn 
average crash risk after drinking include female 
sex, youth, old age, and light drinking habits. 
As we look toward the next decade we see the 
alcohol-crash problem continuing at about its pre- 
sent level in comparison to highway crashes as a 
whole. The absolute number of the more serious 
alcohol-related crashes will likely increase, barring 
unexpected shifts in trends of key attributes of the 
Highway Transportation System. 
Strategies and Tactics for 
the Alcohol-Crash Risk 
Reducing 
Past strategies and tactics that have been used 




public information and education (PI&E), 
technological, and 
systems. 
Each of these five approaches is discussed in this 
section, 
The Legal Approach 
Legal approaches are based on a set of official 
rules (laws) that define and prohibit drinking driv- 
ing behaviors believed to present unacceptably 
high risk to society. Failure by the driver to comply 
with these rules results in sanctions (for example, 
fines, jail sentences, and loss of driving privileges) 
that are believed to discourage, or deter, persons 
from engaging in the prohibited behavior. Some 
laws are related less directly to drinking driving, for 
example, so-called implied consent laws that re- 
quire drivers either to submit to a chemical test for 
BAC when asked to do so after being arrested for 
drunk driving, or receive a license suspension. 
The legal approach also supports the application 
of "sanctions" by other less formal systems, for ex- 
ample, increased insurance rates after a con- 
viction for drunk driving and the subseqgent avail- 
ability of conviction records to insurance carriers 
- -  
The legal approach has been 
society's traditional response to 
the alcohol-crash problem in the 
United States. 
for adjusting the insurance rates of the drivers. 
The legal approach as sketched out above (see 
Jones and Joscelyn 1976 for a more complete dis- 
cussion) has been society's traditional response to 
the alcohol-crash problem in the United States and 
in many other countries as well. Few applications 
have been carefully evaluated so little is known 
about its effects on crashes. Only one such 
evaluation, in Great Britain, showed clear-cut 
results in reducing alcohol crash losses. The 
evaluation concerned a program of law changes 
known as the British Road Safety Act of 1967. The 
new British legislation set a lower legal limit for 
intoxication (-08% wlv BAC) and provided that 
driving with an illegally high BAC-whether or not 
driving impairment occurred-was an offense. The 
Act also expanded the powers of police to demand 
that drivers take a breath test after crashes and law 
The concept of deterrence is the 
basis for the legal approach. Its 
 remise is that behavior can be 
prevented by the threat of 
punishment. 
violations as well as on suspicion of impairment. 
An extensive public information and education 
campaign accompanied passage of the Act and its 
enforcement. This program was evaluated post 
hoc by Ross (1973) and was found to have 
achieved a three-year decrease in the rate of "ac- 
cident casualties." Another foreign program grow- 
ing out of Dutch legislation setting the legal limit of 
intoxication at -05% w/v BAC may have had a 
similar temporary effect, but the final findings are 
not yet complete. 
In the United States, the National Highway Traf- 
fic Safety Administration (NHTSA) sponsored a 
series of Alcohol Safety Action Projects (ASAPs) 
that employed a combination of legal, health/legal, 
and other approaches. Early evaluations by 
NHTSA reported that the ASAP program was hav- 
ing a positive effect on the alcohol-crash problem 
across all sites, but these findings were disputed. 
The NHTSA evaluators themselves found little to 
support the hypothesis that the legal component of 
their program was responsible for the effects they 
reported. A more recent NHTSA evaluation of 
ASAP ( U 3 .  Department of Transportation 1979), 
not yet critiqued by the highway safety com- 
munity, reports positive effects for twelve out of 
thirty-five ASAP sites and attributed at least some 
of the effect to the legal component. NHTSA's field 
experiment in Stockton, California suggests that its 
greatly increased enforcement activity has 
decreased the percentage of drunk drivers on the 
roads but produced no significant decrease in 
alcohol-related collisions. Assessments of other 
legal approaches in the U.S. and abroad have 
either shown no effect in reducing crash losses or 
have been inconclusive. 
As noted above, the concept of deterrence is 
the basis for the legal approach. Its premise is that 
behavior can be prevented by the threat of punish- 
ment. Deterrence theory suggests that deterrence 
can be accomplished when members of the target 
population believe that the threat (1) is applicable 
to them personally, ( 2 )  can and will be enforced 
and (3) would cause them sufficient unpleasant- 
ness to outweigh any positive benefits derived 
from drunk driving. 
It seems likely that the failure of legal ap- 
proaches to maintain long-term effects on the 
drinking-driving problem can be attributed to a 
failure to meet one or more of these deterrence re- 
quirements. For example, the British Road Safety 
Act concentrated on creating a perception of the 
severe deterrent threat but did not maintain the 
public information and education effort and did not 
back up the perceived threat with effective 
Most applications of the health 
approach to the drinking driving 
problem have been conducted in . 
concert with legal approaches and 
thus cons1:itute what has come to 
be called-a healthllegal approach. 
enforcement and sanctioning action. Thus long- 
term deterrence was not achieved because the 
proclaimed threat did not remain credible. Other 
applications also have been unsuccessful over a 
long period of time because their enforcement ac- 
tivities were not sufficiently publicized to reach 
drivers who were not apprehended for drunk driv- 
ing. There is now evidence from studies con- 
ducted in Califorriia that imposition of severe sanc- 
tions can have a deterrent effect on the sanctioned 
driver, Three quasi-experimental studies con- 
ducted by the California Department of Motor 
Vehicles provided evidence that license action is 
the most effective available means of reducing 
recidivism (subsequent impaired driving and traffic 
crashes). The first study (Hagen 1978) found 
license suspension to have a deterrent effect that 
lasted beyond the term of suspension. The second 
study (Hagen, Williams, and McConnell 19'79) 
found that treatment programs demonstrated no 
advantages over license action. The most recent 
California study (Hagen, McConnell, and Williams 
1980) compared recidivism records of impaired 
driving offenders and found that multiple offenders 
who suffered license suspensions had belter 
recidivism rates than offenders who received no 
suspension. This suggests that such a deterrent 
threat could be extended to the larger driver pop- 
ulation through effective public information and 
education measures. 
The Health Approach 
Health approaches are aimed at the underlyilng 
drinking problems that often exist among in- 
dividuals who drive with high BACs. Various treat- 
ments and therapies (such as Alcoholics 
Anonymous) are applied to such individuals in an 
effort to induce more moderate drinking habits or 
to eliminate drinking entirely. Rehabilitation and 
education programs (such as drunk drivers' 
schools) for all types of drinking drivers are also in- 
cluded in this category. 
Most applications of the health approach to ttie 
drinking driving problem have been conducted in 
concert with legal approaches and thus constitute 
what has come to be called a health/legal ap- 
proach. In this combined approach, the strategy is 
to use the resources and methods of both the traf- 
fic law system and the public health system to 
reduce the incidence of drinking driving among an 
identified target group. A basic tenet is that neither 
the traffic law system alone with the punishment!;, 
Treatment programs tend to have 
a long-term rather than a short- 
term effect on both alcohol 
consumption and behavioral and 
social impairment of persons with 
drinking problems. 
nor the public health system alone with its treat- 
ments, can adequately deal with the problem. The 
combined resources of both systems are needecl 
to bring about the desired behavioral changes 
through the application of individually tailored mix., 
tures of punishment and treatment. Thus, the 
health/legal system must apprehend and arrange 
for the punishment and treatment of drinking 
dr~vers in the target population. 
Under NHTSA sponsorship, we recently com- 
pleted a nationwide study of healthllegal systems 
(Jones, Joscelyn, and McNair 1979). We found 
that practically every conceivable means of iden- 
. 
tifying, referring, and treating drunk drivers was 
being practiced somewhere. Unfortunately we 
found no evidence that any of the approaches or 
their specific applications had reduced alcohol- 
related crashes or drunk driving. Some of this lack 
of evidence of highway safety impact can be at- 
tributed to the lack of rigorous evaluations of these 
programs. However, some programs have been 
evaluated and found to have no effect, or even a 
negative effect on crashes (Nichols et al. 1978; 
Preusser, Ulmer, and Adams 1976). 
Two possible reasons are suggested for this dif- 
ficulty in showing highway safety benefits. First, 
the health component of the healthllegal approach 
requires that for an individual to be treated he or 
she must first be brought into the system after hav- 
ing been apprehended in the act of driving drunk. 
Although the exact probability of apprehension for 
drunk driving in a given jurisdiction is not known, it 
has been estimated to be quite low, of the order of 
1 chance in 200 to 1 chance in 2000 drunk driving 
trips. This means that an individual who drove 
drunk four times a week could expect to continue 
doing so for about one to ten years before being 
caught. Once apprehended, the driver then has to 
be properly processed and sent to an "ap- 
propriate" treatment. 
The difficulty of finding and then providing this 
appropriate treatment is the second reason why it 
is difficult to reduce alcohol-related crashes 
through the health/legal approach. A recent report 
to the U.S. Congress on alcohol and health noted: 
Few differences in effectiveness among treab- 
ment settings, types and direction have been 
identified. The patients' characteristics and 
motivation may be the essential factors in the 
recovery process. (Noble 1978, p. 76) 
In this case, effectiveness was stated in terms of 
alcohol consumption, behavioral effect, and social 
adjustment. While Noble's conclusion applied only 
to alcoholics, similar difficulties have been noted in 
programs dealing with individuals with less severe 
drinking problems. Studies also suggest that treat- 
ment programs tend to have a long-term rather 
than a short-term effect on both alcohol con- 
sumption and behavioral and social impairment of 
persons with drinking problems. This makes 
program evaluation more difficult and the iden- 
tification of the appropriate treatment more 
tenuous. 
The Public Information and 
Education Approach 
Public information and education (PI&E) ap- 
proaches attempt to reduce the incidence of drink- 
ing driving by campaigns informing and educating 
various population groups about the nature of the 
problem. Such programs address drinking drivers 
directly by attempting to get them to refrain from 
drinking driving in the future or indirectly by at- 
tempting to enlist support of other persons as well 
as actions against drinking driving. A television 
commercial designed to motivate persons to drive 
an intoxicated individual home from a party is an 
example of the indirect approach. PI&E ap- 
proaches are most commonly used in com- 
bination with other approaches (for example, 
legal), both to inform the public about the actions 
that will be undertaken to control drunk driving and 
to create a climate of public support for the alcohol 
safety program. 
Content of drinking driving laws has been the 
focus for most campaigns associated with the in- 
troduction of new drinking driving legislation. The 
British campaign of 1967 was designed to 
heighten awareness of the public to their rights and 
obligations under the new legislation. The 
establishment of per se BAC limits that made 
evidence of driving impairment unnecessary; the, 
procedures for the apprehension, arrest and 
charging of drinking driving; and the penalties as- 
sociated with convictions were the major variables 
about which information was disseminated in this 
campaign. 
Many other information campaigns in the United 
States, Canada, England, and Australia have been 
conducted when it was determined that although 
drinking driving laws were not new, the public was 
poorly informed about the dangers of drinking and 
driving and entertained attitudes not conducive to 
safe driving behavior, or engaged in behavior that 
contributed to the dangers of drinking and driving. 
Attempts have also been made to change the 
social value attached to driving after consuming 
alcohol. Both tlie 1967 British and a similar 1969 
Canadian cam~paign also measured public at- 
titudes about the adequacy of the new legislation 
to prevent or to reduce alcohol-related accidents. 
In the United States the ASAPs sponsored by 
NHTSA have conducted public information cam- 
paigns since 1971. They attempted to develop an 
There is evidence that PI&E 
carnpaigris can increase the 
public's knowledge about drinking 
' driving laws and its understanding 
of the effect alcohol has on the 
body and driving skills. There is 
little evidence to show that PI&E 
campaigrls themselves change 
either attitudes or behavior. 
awareness among the public of the dangers and 
consequences of drinking and driving. They tried 
to personalize the problem of identifying drunk 
drivers as friends, relatives, and acquaintances to 
counteract the tendency to see the drinking driver 
as a deviant. They also attempted to stimulate 
social and peer group concern and to identify 
specific actions each could take to cope with 
drinking drivers. 
Most specialists believe that well designed and 
executed PI&E campaigns can be successful in 
transferring information but cannot in themselves 
bring about behavioral changes. Any alterations of 
individual drinking driving habits that result from 
such campaigns are seen as an unexpected side 
effect, Only in cases where the campaigns are 
combined with other types of countermeasures 
have any behavioral changes been noted. The 
1967 British case is a significant example of a 
campaign W ~ O S E ?  impact went beyond the gain of 
knowledge. 
Inadequate designs for evaluation have made it 
difficult to deterrrline the exact nature and extent of 
the impact of rriost highway safety PI&E cam- 
paigns. Pretesting and posttesting have been done 
for almost all campaigns, but very few of them 
have used control groups. Even the British 
program did not use a control group. 
Media campaigns in Edmonton and Ontario 
used control groups that, in each case, were cities 
selected to match treatment cities in terms of size 
and relative isolation from the media of the treat- 
ment cities. Both of these campaigns were suc- 
cessful in transferring factual information about the 
contents of drinking driving laws. Similar suc- 
cesses were reported in a media campaign in 
Sydney, Australia. 
In the case of the British Road Safety Act of 
1967, results of public opinion surveys indicated 
an increase in knowledge about the BAC limit, 1he 
ability of the breath test to determine alcohol con- 
sumption, that refusal to take a breath test could 
lead to an arrest, and loss of license as a con- 
sequence of refusing to take a breath test. 
In the United States, the ASAP evaluation can- 
cluded that "in each area of concentration sub- 
stantially more sites with public information 2.c- 
tivities achieved positive results than sites without 
an effort" (US.  Department of Transportati~m 
1975a, p.1). It should be noted that all of the 
ASAPs conducted other types of counter- 
measures concurrently with public information arid 
education campaigns, and that most used only a 
pretesting and posttesting in their evaluation of 
campaign effectiveness. However, the pretest and 
posttest surveys did show that sites with public in- 
formation and education campaigns indicated 
greater gains in knowledge than sites without such 
campaigns. 
In sum, there is evidence that PI&E campaigris 
can increase the public's knowledge about drinc- 
ing driving laws and its understanding of the effect 
alcohol has on the body and driving skills. There is 
little evidence to show that PI&E campaigns them- 
selves change either attitudes or behavior. 
In the few cases in which behavioral change oc- 
curred, PI&E campaigns were conducted in con- 
junction with other countermeasures and in most 
cases the impact of the PI&E campaign could not 
be isolated from the impact of other counter- 
measures. Thus, research does not show that such 
campaigns in general are ineffective but merely in- 
dicates that they have not been successful in 
reducing crashes when used alone. There is 
evidence that they have been effective in sup- 
porting other alcohol safety approaches, par- 
ticularly the legal approach. 
The Technological Approach 
Technological approaches use modern tech- 
nology to interrupt the sequence of events leading 
to drinking driving, A wide range of technologies 
has been suggested for such applications, from 
pharmaceuticals designed to speed up the sober- 
ing process to devices for warning drivers about 
the presence of a car with a drunk driver. In the 
past, specific applications of technology to the 
drinking driver problem have been limited almost 
entirely to devices that support the legal and health 
approaches described above. No purely or even 
largely technological approach has yet been tried, 
although several have been proposed and studied. 
It is interesting that, although 
evidential breath testers have been 
used for nearly thirty years, no 
formal evaluation of their 
effectiveness in supporting legal 
and health/legal objectives has 
been made. 
In this section we discuss the type of tech- 
nology that had the greatest impact on the alcohol- 
crash problem, breath alcohol analysis. Some 
other possible but untried applications of 
technology are described briefly. 
The purpose of breath-alcohol testing for traffic 
safety purposes has been to calculate BAC from 
breath specimens. The earliest such device used 
extensively in the United States (after passage of 
the 1939 law in Indiana admitting chemical test 
results as evidence) was the Hargar Drunk- 
ometer. Since that time, a wide variety of breath 
testing instruments have been developed, one of 
the most successful and widely used being the 
Breathalyzer@ developed by Robert F. Borken- 
stem. 
Current breath testing devices have been clas- 
s~fied as to their application and support of efforts 
to control the drinking driver. Six basic classes of 
~nstrumentation were defined in one study 
(Moulden and Voas 1975): 
* screening breath testers, 
evidential breath testers, 
roadside collection devices, 
passive breath testers, 
educational testers, and 
alcohol safety interlock systems. 
A more useful classification can be developed 
based on the involvement of the individual to be 
tested. Active breath test devices require the driver 
to provide a sample of deep lung breath for 
analysis. Passive devices capture normally ex- 
pelled breath and do not require the cooperation 
of the driver. The first three classes defined above 
(screening breath testers, evidential breath testers, 
and roadside collection devices) are all active 
devices. The first two devices provide a direct 
readingc The third class, roadside collection 
devices, are used to collect breath samples for 
later analysis by evidential breath testing. 
The use of an active breath test device con- 
stitutes what is defined by the law as a search. 
Thus, active tests can be administered only as per- 
mitted by the U.S. Constitution and applicable 
statutory law. In general, an active test cannot be 
demanded of a driver unless an officer has 
probable cause to arrest the driver for an alcohol- 
impaired driving offense. This is a constitutional 
constraint. Most states, by statute, require an ac- 
tual arrest before a test can be required under the 
state's implied consent law. 
Active test devices produce either a qualitative 
indication of intoxication (in which case it is a 
screening device) or a quantitative reading of BAC 
that is accurate enough to be used as evidence of 
intoxication in which case it is an evidential test 
device. It is interesting that, although evidential 
breath testers have been used for nearly thirty 
years, no formal evaluation of their effectiveness in 
supporting legal and heaithllegal objectives has 
been made. They are now such an integral part of 
both approaches that it seems doubtful that any 
meaningful evaluation could now be performed. 
As more accurate screening devices become 
commercially available and as quantitative testers 
have become more portable, efforts have been 
made to increase roadside testing of drivers. The 
use of roadside tests has resulted in increased ar- 
rests. Also, the average BAC of arrested drivers 
tended to be lower in some field experiments using 
the roadside testing devices. The use of chemical 
tests at the roadside is likely to result in more ac- 
curate evidence in cases of impaired driving; more 
efficient law enforcement operations; and less 
inconvenience for the motorist. 
Laws intended to permit roadside testing prior to 
arrest have been passed in several states. Such 
laws are advocated by NHTSA to assist an officer 
"to establish probable cause for an arrest." While 
the objective of facilitating roadside testing is 
worthwhile, preliminary breath test laws that pur- 
port to allow an officer to require a test when 
probable cause to arrest does not exist are not 
constitutional. The approach advocated by 
NHTSA should not be followed. A more direct ap- 
proach, and a constitutional one, is to amend ex- 
isting implied consent laws to provide for roadside 
. 
testing when probable cause to arrest exists. Most 
such laws now require a formal arrest, a time-con- 
suming process that is costly for law enforcement 
personnel and inconvenient for the motorist. The 
constitutional requirement for a search (which 
category includles the active test) is that evidence 
sufficient to arrest exist. Recent court decisions 
have held that a formal arrest is not required to 
search for evidence that is likely to disappear, like 
that of alcohol presence that changes over time. 
Thus probable cause to arrest a driver for drunk 
driving is still a constitutional requirement of 
testing, whereas a formal arrest is not. 
A more detailed discussion of these issues can 
be found in a report recently prepared for NHTSA 
(Ruschmann et al. 1980). One of the papers in this 
series-Alcohol, Drugs, and Traffic Law- 
specifically addresses legal issues and makes 
recommendatioris for legislative action, 
Analysis of the various technology 
conceptsout l ined above indicates 
substantie11 problems in using any 
of them (other than the active test 
devices) in  operational programs 
to  reduce ,the incidence of alcohol- 
related crashes. 
The remaining breath testers have not yet been 
used operationally. Passive breath testing 
devices (now called noncooperative breath 
testers) might hlelp overcome the objection that 
prearrest breath testing constitutes an illegal 
search or seizure. They would make a qualitative 
determination of breath alcohol by "sniffing" the air 
around the driver and would not require the 
driver's cooperaition. Educational testers (now 
called self-testers) would be used by drivers to 
determine if their BACs had reached levels in- 
dicating impairment. They could be low-cost, in- 
dividual, disposable devices that could be dis- 
tributed by liquor stores, schools, and the like, or 
reusable breath testers that could be installed in 
places such as bars and restaurants. 
The drunk driver warning system (DDWS) 
concept has superseded the alcohol safety in- 
terlock system at NHTSA. The DDWS concept 
would allow an impaired driver to start the vehicle 
but would cause the vehicle's emergency lights to 
fiash at speeds of less than 10 mph and the horn to 
sound intermittently at speeds above 10 mph. A 
possible use of the DDWS would be to install it on 
cars of convicted drunk drivers as a condition of 
probation. 
Again, neither the noncooperative breath tester, 
self-tester, nor the DDWS has yet been 
demonstrated to be feasible for use in drinking 
driving control programs. Tests with the self-tester 
(Oates 1978; Sharp and Perry 1978) suggest 
limited usefulness in the applications tested. 
A variety of other technology-oriented concepts 
have been suggested for dealing with the alcohol- 
crash problem (Voas 1970). One device would 
monitor driving performance continuously for 
clues that would betray alcohol impairment. When 
the device indicated unacceptably high impair- 
ment, a warning signal would be given or a speed 
governor would be activated. A similar system has 
been designed to prevent truck drivers from falling 
asleep. It has also been suggested that a 
mechanical or electronic device be built to restrict 
convicted drunk drivers to driving only during cer- 
tain specified hours. The device could use a light 
sensor or timing mechanism either to activate an 
interlock or to give a warning signal if the vehicle 
has been driven during restricted (for example, 
nighttime) hours. Alternatively, an operating tirrie 
recorder could be used to indicate if the vehic e 
had been driven during restricted hours. 
An application of pharmacological technology 
has been studied as a means to reducing the im- 
pairing effects of alcohol. Several drugs for block- 
ing the effects of alcohol on the nervous systern 
have been tested in search for such a "sobering 
pill" (Noble 1974). Research is continuing in the 
area, but no practical drug for cancelling the el'- 
fects of alcohol has yet been discovered. 
Analysis of the various technology concepts 
outlined above indicates substantial problems i7 
using any of them (other than the active test 
devices) in operational programs to reduce the in- 
cidence of alcohol-related crashes. In some cases 
(for example, the sobering pill) feasibility has not 
been demonstrated. The drinking driver may 
decide not to use the self-tester, and the cost of 
self-testers may be too high for practical use. All of 
these devices would run the risk of being defeated 
by ingenious drivers and could present legal 
problems. 
The Systems Approach 
Most past and proposed programs for dealing 
with the drinking driver employ two or more of the 
above four approaches-legal, health, PI&E, and 
technological-simultaneously. For example, the 
healthliegal approach is a combination of the 
health and legal approaches. Programs that 
methodically employ several approaches have 
been called systems approaches in the literature. 
The term "systems approach" appears to have 
been introduced in the early 1950s to describe 
techniques for managing large and complex aero- 
space projects (Jones and Joscelyn 1976). One of 
the first documented applications of the systems 
approach to the alcohol crash problem was the 
Joscelyn and Jones (1 971) analysis of the drinking 
driver control system. 
In 1969, the National Highway Safety Bureau 
(later the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration) of the U S .  Department of Trans- 
portation announced the nationwide Alcohol 
Safety Action Project (ASAP), many of whose ac- 
No other alcohol-safety program of 
comparable scope, depth, and size 
has attempted the systems 
approach to the same degree as 
ASAP. 
tivities have been reported earlier in this document. 
The program provided financial assistance to and 
coordinated the efforts of at first nine and ultimate- 
ly thirty-five ASAPs around the country. From the 
beginning it advocated the systems approach, 
declaring that "in planning and managing an 
ASAP the project director will need to use the 
systems approach in order to properly integrate all 
the complex aspects involved" (McKnight, Adams, 
and Personeus 1971). 
No other alcohol-safety program of comparable 
scope, depth, and size has attempted the systems 
approach to the same degree as ASAP, although 
some jurisdictions have applied and continued to 
apply some of its concepts of their own. For this 
reason the remaining discussion of the systems 
approach to drinking driver control will be limited 
to ASAP, with particular emphasis on what is most 
relevant to the systems concept rather than on the 
individual countermeasures discussed previously 
in this paper to illustrate other approaches. 
ASAP was heavily oriented toward the problem- 
drinking driver. Early ASAP publications claimed 
ASAP used a combination of the 
legal, health, public information 
and education, and technological 
approaches in its attack on 
alcohol-crash risk. 
the problem-drinking driver was responsible for 
two-thirds of the alcohol-related traffic fatalities in 
the United States and thirty-four percent of all traf- 
fic fatalities. (We note that facts do not support this 
claim.) ASAP also placed emphasis on drinking 
drivers who drive at night and on weekends, draw- 
ing upon research that has indicated an increased 
prevalence of alcohol impaired drivers using the 
roads and involved in crashes at such times. 
The ultimate goal of the ASAP was to 
"demonstrate and evaluate the feasibility, 
methodology and impact of comprehensive multi- 
faceted countermeasure programs designed to 
reduce the incidence of alcohol as a causal factor 
in motor vehicle crashes" (Crittenden 1970). 
Individual ASAP projects were conducted at the 
local level emphasizing improved law enforce- 
ment, traffic court procedures, public information, 
and special efforts to counsel and assist drivers. 
The local activities were designed to be com- 
plemented by state-level efforts in driver licensing, 
motor vehicle registration, traffic records, and 
legislation. Some $88 million was allocated directly 
to the ASAP program, but 37% of this was used in 
the management and evaluation of the projects 
(US. Department of Transportation 1979), Ad- 
ditional funds far in excess of the $88 million 
quoted by NHTSA were expended in the form of 
local "match" and other NHTSA research and 
development activities conducted explicitly to sup- 
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port the ASAP effort. A more reasonable estimate 
of ASAP's total cost would be in excess of $200 
million. 
Each project had an operational lifetime of at 
least three years (see Figure 10). The first group of 
nine ASAPs began operating in 1971 and twenty- 
six additional ASAPs initiated operations in 1972. 
The locations were widely distributed around the 
United States and included one site in Puerto Rico 
(see Figure 11). 
ASAP used a combination of the legal, health, 
public information and education, and tech- 
nological approaches in its attack on the alcohol- 
crash risk. Eventually five separate categories of 
countermeasure activity evolved: 
enforcement, 
judicial and legislative, 
presentence investigation and probation, 
rehabilitation, and 
public information and education. 
The first result of ASAP's systems approach 
were published in a 1974 report (US. Department 
of Transportation 1974). The data were taken from 
eight projects that had collected three years of 
"baseline" data and two years of "operational" 
data. In addition there were three years of base- 
line and one year of operational data from twenty- 
one sites initiated a year later than the first eight 
sites. 
Large increases in activity were noted in the 
report. For example, arrests rose more than 100% 
overall and 60% of those arrested were processed 
by the courts. The increases in activity were not, 
however, reflected in proportionate decreases in 
night fatal crashes (a surrogate measure for 
alcohol-related fatalities), the measure of effec- 
tiveness used by NHTSA. On the average, night 
fatal crashes per licensed driver decreased from 
12.9 to 12.5, or only about 3%. No correlation was 
found between ASAP activity and highway safety 
impact. Nevertheless, NHTSA reported that the 
ASAP resulted in from 65 to 174 fewer fatalities 
over a period of 2 years in the 8 intitial sites. The 
averted fatalities represent a dollar savings to 
society of $13 to $35 million, compared to an out- 
lay of approximately $14 million over 3 years. 
NHTSA's findings on ASAP impact have been 
disputed by many analysts. For example, a more 
rigorous analysis by Zador (1976) compared the 
ASAP crash figures with those in comparison cities 
with similar highway safety and other attributes. 
Zador found decreases in the proportion of night 
fatal crashes to day fatal crashes in the ASAP 
areas, but concluded that the ASAP counter- 
measures could not have been responsible for the 
observed reductions in the ratio of night fatal 
crashes to day fatal crashes and that "ASAP's 
large scale social programs have been ineffective" 
(Zador 1976, p, 48). 
A second NHTSA evaluation report (U.S. 
Department of Transportation 1975a) used ad- 
ditional data to analyze the impact of the twenty- 
one later ASAPs after two years of operation. This 
report found some evidence of a reduction in 
alcohol-related fatal crashes that could be at- 
tributed to ASAP and questioned Zador's analysis 
claiming that his control groups were actually 
comparison groups that did not adequately match 
the ASAP groups. In a later article Zador (1977) 
repudiated NHTSA's criticisms and held to his 
original conclusions about ASAPs ineffectiveness 
as large-scale social programs. 
The latest ASAP evaluation report (US. Depart- 
ment of Transportation 1979) departed from the 
approach of the previous two evaluations and 
evaluated each ASAP site separately rather than 
evaluating the ASAP program across all sites. The 
evaluators found that twelve of the thirty-five ASAP 
sites showed significant reductions in nighttime 
fatal crashes. This evaluation also used com- 
parison sites selected on the basis of the following 
attributes: percentage urban, fuel expenditures per 
capita, dollars spent in eating and drinking 
establishments, drinking age, and population 
change for one year. The site-matching procedure 
resulted in some interesting site pairs, such 
as Washtenaw County, Michigan, and San 
Diego, California; Birmingham, Alabama, and 
Delaware; and Lincoln, Nebraska, and Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, 
The actual effectiveness of the ASAP program is 
unknown and may never be known. NHTSA has 
never published all the original data and reports 
from the individual sites. This has occurred even 
though federal law, U.S. Department of Trans- 
portation regulations, and NHTSA's own regula- 
tions require the prompt release of such data and 
reports. Instead, NHTSA has chosen to publish its 
own "evaluations" of the ASAP program. Needless 
to say, the NHTSA publications are generally 
positive about the "results" of the ASAP effort. 
In 1979 and 1980 NHTSA placed copies of 
many of the ASAP reports in the NHTSA Technical 
Library. While this action greatly increased the 
availability of the reports, it did not make them ac- 
cessible to many likely users. The delay in making 
the reports available also reduced their utility for 
Perhaps, the most important 
lesson to learn from the ASAP 
experience is how complex a 
problem traffic crashes really are 
and that siimplistic, single-focus 
solutions are not likely to produce 
results. 
policy formulation and the likelihood of indepen- 
dent review. 
Practitioners should read the NHTSA evalua- 
tions with a critical perspective. Acceptance of all 
claims of success is not warranted. Some general 
points are reasonable; for example, the general 
deterrence concept that uses the legal approach 
coupled with public information and education 
seems the most reasonable approach available 
today. 
Perhaps, the most important lesson to learn 
from the ASAP experience is how complex a 
problem traffic crashes really are and that 
simplistic, single-focus solutions are not likely to 
produce results. It is also important to recognize 
that knowledge must exist before demonstration 
can occur. The ASAPs were intended as 
"demonstration projects" to show how "known 
Practitioners planning local 
programs should recognize that 
alcohol is a, long-term public health 
problem. A81cohol use and misuse 
existed long before the 
automobile. 
methods" could deal with the drinking driver. What 
the ASAPs did sliow was that the knowledge did 
not exist in sufficient detail to warrant demonstra- 
tion in the first place. Discovery had not been com- 
pleted before the demonstration began. I 
The ASAPs are a complex chapter in the history 
of highway safety. They represent the expenditure 
of huge sums of money and honest effort by many 
people with, at best, limited success. There are, of 
course, many reasons for the limited success, Two 
premises that influenced the design and initial 
planning of the program contributed significantly 
to the lack of success and should be avoided in 
the future. 
First, the ASAPs were conceived as a federal 
demonstration program that would show local 
jurisdictions how to deal with a local problem. The 
belief that the federal government had a better un- 
derstanding of how to deal with local problerns 
than local people was widely held in federal agen- 
cies in the sixties and seventies. ASAP was only 
one of a number of federal demonstration 
programs that failed to achieve success. 
Second, the initial focus of ASAP on the 
problem drinker (an imprecise term) as the 
primary target was too simplistic. The initial gclal 
was to reduce alcohol-impaired driving through 
special deterrence, Treatment, in many cases, was 
substituted for traditional legal sanctions. When it 
became apparent that the program had not had a 
significant effect on deterring the problem drinker 
(Nichols et al. 1978), the objectives of the prograin 
were simply redefined to that of a general deter- 
rence program (US.  Department of Transportation 
1979) and evaluations conducted in the new con- 
text. Thus, the final evaluations of the program do 
not measure the success in terms of the initial 
objectives. 
Practitioners planning local programs should 
recognize that alcohol is a long-term public health 
problem. Alcohol use and misuse existed long 
before the automobile. Alcohol-impaired driving 
creates traffic crash risk and requires a highway 
safety risk management response. The response, 
however, must be based upon an adequate under- 
standing of the risk; the limitations of current 
knowledge; and the realization that a long-tern1 
continuing program will be required. 
Summary 
The alcohol-crash problem is one of the most 
researched areas in the field of highway safety, 
Large sums of money have been spent on efforts 
to reduce its magnitude. Despite this activity, the 
alcohol-crash risk remains at about the same level 
as it was twenty or more years ago. We predict no 
significant changes in the short term in the condi- 
tions that create this risk. 
The alcohol-crash problem first identified in 
1904 is still with us today, but on a much larger 
scale. Epidemiologic research indicates that some 
one-half of all fatally injured drivers were legally 
too intoxicated to drive (that, is had a BAC of -10% 
W/V or more). An estimated 5% to 13% of drivers in 
less serious crashes also had these high BACs. 
We do not know how many of these crashes were 
actually caused by alcohol, but research shows ' 
For the immediate future, our 
methods of dealing with this 
problem must continue to rely 
mostly on traditional approaches 
because there are no greatly 
improved new approaches nearing 
readiness for use. 
that the risk of a serious crash increases greatly as 
the driver's BAC approaches . lo% wlv. The fact 
that many basic skills related to driving are im- 
paired in most individuals at BACs of . lo% wlv or 
more provides further evidence that alcohol is a 
causal factor in a great many crashes that involve 
drivers with these BACs. Research also indicates 
that alcohol is a factor in more than one-third of all 
adult pedestrian fatalities. 
Responses to the alcohol-crash problem have 
relied mostly on traditional societal systems for 
controlling dysfunctional behavior. Of these, the 
legal system with its formal lawmaking, enforcing, 
adjudicating, and sanctioning elements have been 
The present state of knowledge 
suggests that punitive sanctions, 
especially license revocation and 
suspension, have the greatest 
effect on reducing future drunk 
driving violations among drivers 
who have been caught and 
punished for drunk driving. 
the primary mechanism, Its strategy has been 
based largely on the concept of deterrence. It 
operates on the premise that a driver con- 
templating driving after drinking will be deterred if 
he or she believes the punishments that would 
result would outweigh the benefits. 
In recent years, this legal approach has been 
combined with a health approach that envisions 
drunk driving as an illness and a public health 
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problem that can and should be treated rather than 
punished. Both of these approaches have been 
supported by a public information and education 
(PI&E) approach and by modern technology. 
Comprehensive systems approaches employing 
elements of all these approaches have been tried 
in some jurisdictions. 
Sadly, none of these approaches has yet had 
much of an effect on the problem. Only the British 
Road Safety Act of 1967, a legal approach with a 
heavy PI&E component, has shown unequivocal 
results; however, its effects did not last. This unfor- 
tunate state of affairs is compounded by the fact 
that we still do not know why the various ap- 
proaches did or did not work. 
For the immediate future, our methods of deal- 
ing with this problem must continue to rely mostly 
on traditional approaches because there are no 
greatly improved new approaches nearing 
readiness for use. The legal system will remain the 
main control mechanism, identifying drunk drivers 
through enforcement action and punishing or 
treating those found to have violated drinking driv- 
ing laws. 
At present, it appears that the legal approach 
operates best in a general deterrence mode in 
which combined legal-PI&E actions are aimed at 
broad target groups of drinking drivers. Local 
jurisdictions should "beef up" their current legal 
system efforts to ensure that they present a credi- 
ble threat to drivers in terms of probability of their 
apprehension and receiving a suitably unpleasant 
punishment. Locally oriented PI&E programs 
should be used to convey information about that 
threat as well as the related threat to safety posed 
by drunk driving. 
In focusing on general deterrence, the special 
deterrence mode should not be abandoned. The 
present state of knowledge suggests that punitive 
sanctions, especially license revocation and 
suspension, have the greatest effect on reducing 
future drunk driving violations among drivers who 
have been caught and punished for drunk driving. 
However, such sanctions alone seem more ap- 
propriate for drivers who have not yet developed a 
serious drinking problem. Problem drinkers ap- 
pear to require treatment as well as punishment. 
Although the highway safety value of a treatment- 
oriented approach has not yet been established, it 
is sound from a conceptual and humane point of 
view and should continue to be practiced. 
Recommendations for Action 
The previous sections have provided an overview of the alcohol-crash risk and management actions 
undertaken in the past to deal with the risk. While no single approach has achieved dramatic success in 
reducing alcohol-impaired driving, current knowledge suggests that local programs to deal with impaired 
driving are needed and should contain the following elements. 
Identify The Alcohol Crash Risk The nature and magnitude of the risk created by alcohol- 
impaired drivers should be established to form the basis flor 
countermeasure programs. The size of the problem will have to be 
established to persuade the public and public officials to take arid 
support action to reduce the risk. Calculation of alcohol-related 
crash losses in terms of deaths, injuries, and costs is necessary. 
Comparisons can then be made with other risks that the com- 
munity accepts as important to manage (such as fire, crime, dis- 
ease, and pollution). 
Precisely establishing the risk is also necessary for the evalua- 
tion of programs designed to reduce it. Obviously, if the 
magnitude of the risk is unknown prior to the start of a counter- 
measure program, it will be impossible to determine whether ihe 
program has any effect. 
Select Risk Management Understanding the nature of the alcohol-crash risk in a jurisdic- 
Strategies and Tactics and tion provides a framework for selection of strategies and tactics. 
Allocate Resources Specific targets for action are also likely to be suggested by thls 
experience of past crashes. These may include, for example!, 
specific locations or times of the day where enforcemer~t 
resources should be concentrated. 
Current knowledge suggests that the best general strategy is 
the legal approach accompanied by public information and 
education programs. Referral of individuals with drinking 
problems to health care facilities is probably warranted but may 
not have significant highway safety benefits. 
A more detailed description of strategies and tactics is providecl 
in the literature contained in the Bibliography. 
Implement Risk Management Implementation of the selected strategies and tactics shoulcf 
Actions be accomplished from a risk management perspective. All 
involved should keep the ultimate objectives in mind, and avoicl 
mere activity. 
Likely specific actions will include: 
Enactment of an adequate legal base. 
Rigorous enforcement. 
Adjudication and sanctioning from a highway safety 
perspective. License suspension or revocation should be 
considered for repeat offenders and, when warranted, for 
first offenders. 
Public information and education programs to create an un- 
derstanding of the alcohol risk and the actions that are being 
undertaken to manage it. The objective should be to create a 
climate-of public opinion that makes alcohol-impaired driving 
socially unacceptable. Individuals should also be made 
aware what will happen to them if they are caught driving 
while impaired. Establishing the climate of societal opinion 
and the perception of what will happen to alcohol-impaired 
drivers who are caught are important elements of a general 
deterrence approach. 
* Referral of individuals with a drinking problem to treatment 
facilities. Care should be taken to ensure that highway safety 
objectives are met. Treatment alone may not deter individuals 
from continuing to drink and drive. 
The literature identified in the Bibliography provides more detail 
on the implementation of risk management actions. 
Evaluate Outcomes in Terms of Evaluation of the risk management program is an essential part 
Risk Reduction of its structure. Absent an evaluation component, there is no ob- 
jective measure of success. It would be like trying to run a for- 
profit enterprise without ever creating a balance sheet. 
Evaluation will not be easy. Not every program can afford nor 
will warrant a full-scale scientific evaluation. Still, every program 
must develop some measures of performance. Perhaps the most 
important thing to remember when creating the evaluation compo- 
nent is the objective of the program-the reduction of the traffic 
crash risk caused by alco hol-impaired drivers, Evaluation should 
measure risk reduction, not activity. While it is important to know 
how many people are arrested, charged, found guilty, sentenced, 
referred to treatment, and so forth, this information by itself is a 
mere description of activity. Measures that relate more directly to 
the risk should be sought. 
Accidents, however, are a relatively infrequent event, and sub- 
ject to many intervening variables; thus they may not be a useful 
measure. Measurement of the frequency of drinking driving, 
social attitudes about drinking and driving, and similar measures 
that relate to the problem should be considered. 
Evaluation has been one of the areas most overlooked in the 
past so that ample room exists for innovation. A word of caution is 
necessary-the literature on alcohol and highway safety is replete 
with claims of success that are based on poor data and poor 
analysis. In some cases, evaluators have fooled some people. In 
other cases, they appear to have fooled themselves. Alcohol and 
highway safety is a complex problem; it is easier to be fooled by it 
than to really address it. Efforts to solve the problem, therefore, 
should be evaluated with care. 
The approaches discussed above are oriented toward the present and the near-term future. Based on 
past h~story, their effect in reducing overall alcohol-crash risk in most jurisdictions will likely be small, 
although large improvements in efficiency may be realized. We believe that a broad-based, continuing 
program of research is needed to develop substantial reductions in alcohol-crash risk, 
In the area of risk identification, epidemiologic studies are needed to determine the risk faced by 
various population groups at various BACs, and to describe the circumstances surrounding alcohol- 
related crashes, as well as the interactions of aicohol with other factors that cause crashes. More 
experimental research is also needed to better define the effects of alcohol on driving tasks as performed 
by groups indicated by past research to have either a high alcohol-crash risk or a high alcohol-crash 
involvement, Critical research needs in the area of risk management strategy and tactics include a 
comprehensive analysis of targets of possible alcohol-safety programs, studies to identify both deterrent 
threats and treatments most appropriate to drinking drivers, studies to determine specifically how public 
information ancl education programs can be used in drinking driver control efforts, and programs to 
develop and apply new technology to existing and new alcohol-safety approaches. 
Local jurisdic;tions can play an important role in thjs research, They provide a "living laboratory" for 
testing and evaluating these new ideas. They should participate in the research and planning process by 
identifying information needs to be addressed by future projects. Thus, the participation of operational 
agencies in research is as important to the success of long-range alcohol-safety programs as their 
involvement in current traditional approaches is to the success of short-range programs. 
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